Operational failure cause of Kanchanjunga Exp disaster, says CRS report, putting Rail Min in a spot
Operational failure—primarily, managing train operations within automatic signal zones and inadequate training of railway personnel—has been highlighted as the primary cause of the accident involving the Kanchanjunga Express and a goods train near Darjeeling in Bengal in the early hours of June 17, leading to the deaths of 10 people, including the loco pilot, or driver of the goods train.
The Commissioner of Railway Safety (CRS) issued a damning report today, categorising the incident under ‘Error in Train Working’. The report has put the Ministry of Railways on the back foot, and that too, just a week before the first Budget Session of Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s third term.
The report said that the paper authority, or T/A 912 that was issued to the loco pilot of the goods train to cross defective signals did not have the highly important recommendation of the speed that the loco pilot was supposed to follow while crossing the defective signal, leading it to ramming into the Kanchanjunga Express from behind.
“Due to improper authority and that too without adequate information, such an incident was an ‘accident-in-waiting’,” mentioned the CRS report.
Another important factor was that while the Kanchanjunga Express adhered to the 15 kmph speed limit and stopped for a minute at each defective signal, other trains, including the goods train involved, did not follow these norms consistently.
The CRS underscored the need for better training and guidance for loco pilots and station masters operating in automatic signaling territories.
The report also highlighted a concerning number of signal failures in automatic signaling territories, noting 208 instances of ‘Signal Passing at Danger’ (overshooting of red signal) between April 1, 2019 and March 31, 2024, out of which 12 cases resulted in collision.
Such a high number of incidents of red signal overshooting “highlights the limitations of preventive measures taken by zonal railways (counselling of loco pilot/assistant loco pilot, safety drives, etc.)”, the report stated.
The Modi government has made a huge show of the KAVACH Automatic Train Protection (ATP) system, marking it as a major achievement of the Railways Ministry during its tenure.
But the implementation of KAVACH has been patchy at best, a fact that has come into sharp focus following the CRS report’s recommendation to implement KAVACH on top priority across the country.
The report has also recommended artificial intelligence-based systems and GPS-based anti-collision systems in places where the ATP has not been implemented.
“This underscores the need for implementation of the Automatic Train Protection system (KAVACH) on top priority. Use of non-signalling-based systems such as Artificial intelligence-based detection of the RED aspect of the signal and providing an early warning to the loco pilot/GPS-based anti-collision systems shall be explored for provision in locomotive cabs across Indian Railways in non-ATP (automatic train protection) territory,” the CRS report said.
In the case of multiple signal failures, as happened in the incident under discussion, the CRS recommended three options that could have been taken, but none of which were—another aspect of the operational failure highlighted throughout the report:
- Instruct loco pilots to stop the train for one minute at the defective signal and then proceed with great caution till the next;
- Issue a T/A 912 form with a recommendation on the speed to be maintained;
- Allow only one train to enter between two stations and permit no other train to enter the first station till the proceeding train crosses the next station.
